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Abstract
We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where
parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We
show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power
is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks; in a standard P-
A framework by varying the agent’s outside opportunity, in an alternat-
ing offer game, and in a generalized Nash bargaining game. However,
for sufficiently low levels of the agent’s bargaining power, increasing it
marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash bargaining game,
but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game.
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1 Introduction
A standard assumption in the Principal-Agent model is that the principal
makes ‘take it or leave it’ offers to the agent. However, for most real world
problems both parties hold some bargaining power. Furthermore, Pitchford
(1998) recently pointed out that for a large class of cases where the agent
has limited liability the distribution of bargaining power between principal
and agent affects the joint surplus generated by the contract. This may
have important policy implications. For example, the design of labor mar-
ket institutions plays an essential role in determining the distribution of
bargaining power between employers and employees.
To analyze the implications of bargaining power, some authors have com-
pared only the two extreme situations where either the Principal or the
Agent can make ‘take it or leave it’ offers (e.g. Mookherjee and Ray 2002).
By contrast, Pitchford (1998) considers also intermediate allocations of bar-
gaining power, which he represents by varying the agent’s reservation utility
in a standard P-A model. A different approach is adopted by Balkenborg
(2001), who uses the Nash bargaining solution to analyze a similar moral
hazard problem. Alternatively, one could analyze bargaining power in an
alternating offer game with model hazard. None of the cited papers dis-
cusses the relationship between these different options, and the reasons for
adopting their particular approach. The present paper aims to fill this gap.
For the case of risk-neutral parties and a financially constrained agent
we show that the same set of contracts arises from varying the agent’s reser-
vation utility in a P-A model, the discount factors in an alternating offer
game a` la Rubinstein (1982), or the bargaining power coefficient in a Nash
bargaining game. Since our moral hazard model gives rise to a concave
Pareto frontier, this equivalence does not come as a surprise. However, due
to moral hazard and the liability limit the relationship between the differ-
ent ways to represent bargaining power – through the reservation utility,
discount factors and bargaining power coefficients – is not one-to-one as in
a ‘standard’ bargaining game. In particular, variations in the reservation
utility or in discount factors may have no effect on bargaining outcomes,
while changes in the bargaining power coefficient always do so.
In the following, we analyze the three approaches to model bargaining
power.
2 The P-A model with varying outside options
We consider a P-A environment with risk-neutral parties. The value of
output for the principal is v(e), where e ∈ R+ is the agent’s effort associated
with costs c(e). We impose standard requirements, assuming that v(e) is
increasing and concave with v′(0) =∞, while c(e) is increasing and convex.
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None of the above variables is verifiable, resulting in moral hazard. The
principal and the agent observe a contractible binary signal s ∈ {0, 1}, where
s = 1 is a favorable signal (see Milgrom 1981).1 Denoting p(e) ≡ Pr{s =
1|e}, we assume p′(e) > 0, p′′(e) < 0.2 Due to the informational assumptions,
contracts will also be binary. We denote with F the fixed payment and with
b the bonus. Finally, we assume that the agent is financially constrained.
Specifically, we require F, F + b ≥ 0 so that the first-best is not always
obtainable.
In the standard P-A model, the principal’s expected utility is
pi(u¯) ≡ max
{F,b,e}
v(e)− [F + bp(e)] subject to (1)
bp′(e) = c′(e) (2)
F ≥ 0 (3)
F + bp(e)− c(e) ≥ u¯, (4)
where (2) is the incentive compatibility condition, (3) the liability limit
given b > 0, and (4) the constraint on the agent’s utility. Substituting b
from (2) yields the expected bonus B(e) = c′(e)p(e)/p′(e), which we assume
to be convex. This assumption ensures that the first-order condition of the
Lagrangian is sufficient.
Upon varying the agent’s reservation utility, we get the following result.3
Proposition 1 In the P-A model, the principal’s utility is decreasing con-
cave in the agent’s reservation utility u¯. For low values of u¯, the optimal
contract has F = 0, the agent extracts rent and effort is constant at the
second best e∗∗. For high values of u¯, the optimal contract implements first-
best effort e∗ and has F = u¯+ c(e∗)−B(e∗). For intermediate values of u¯,
F = 0, and effort is increasing in u¯.
Proof. From the Lagrangian of the principal’s optimization problem we get
the first-order conditions w.r.t. e and F ,
v′(e)−B′(e) + µ(B′(e)− c′(e)) = 0 (5)
−1 + λ+ µ = 0, (6)
where λ and µ are the Lagrangian multipliers for the limited liability and
participation constraint, respectively.
1This is a generalized version of the problem in Pitchford (1998). Note that the as-
sumption s ∈ {0, 1} is without loss of generality, as in the risk-neutral agency problem
all relevant information from a mechanism design point of view can be summarized by a
binary statistic (see, e.g., Kim 1997).
2These conditions guarantee that the agent’s problem is well behaved. They are equiv-
alent to considering binary signals satisfying MLRC and CDFC.
3For similar results see Pitchford (1998) or Demougin and Fluet (2001), and for an
adverse selection context Inderst (2002).
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There are three cases. With λ = 1, µ = 0, by complementary slackness
F = 0 and the standard second-best effort, e∗∗, obtains from (5). This can
only arise if B(e∗∗) ≥ c(e∗∗)+ u¯. If the inequality is strict, the agent extracts
a rent and small variations in u¯ leave e∗∗, pi∗∗ and u∗∗ unaffected.
As u¯ increases, the constraint on the agent’s utility must become binding
at some point and λ, µ > 0. Thus, fixed payments remain at 0 and effort
follows from the binding constraint on the agent’s utility. Implicitly differen-
tiating w.r.t. u¯ yields eu¯ = [B′(e)−c′(e)]−1 > 0, where the sign follows from
the definition of B(e) and the curvature assumptions. From the envelope
theorem we have piu¯ = −µ < 0. Totally differentiating (5) and rearranging
yields µu¯ > 0 so that for intermediate values of u¯ the Pareto frontier is de-
creasing and concave. With µ = 1, λ = 0 effort attains the social optimum
by (5) and F follows from the binding participation constraint.4 2
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Figure 1: The constrained Pareto frontier
Figure 1 depicts the constrained Pareto frontier, denoted P, of the set
of possible utility pairs (pi, u). In particular, let c ≡ {F, b, e} be an incentive
compatible contract that satisfies the agent’s financial constraint. Then
(pi, u) ∈ P if and only if it is implementable by a contract c, and there
exists no other contract c that is Pareto preferred. For future references, we
denote the set of contracts c that lead to utility pairs on the constrained
Pareto frontier by C ≡ {c : u(c), pi(c) ∈ P}. Observe that there exists a
one-to-one mapping between C and P.
When u¯ < u∗∗, the principal offers a contract yielding utility u∗∗ for the
agent, who extracts a rent u∗∗−u¯. Accordingly, the dashed line above region
I does not belong to P since it cannot arise from a contract c. Raising u¯
reduces the agent’s rent until it falls to zero. When u¯ ≥ u∗∗, increases in
the agent’s reservation utility must be compensated by either raising b or
F . Increasing b is initially advantageous as it raises effort (region II). Once
4This third case can never arise in the framework analyzed by Pitchford due to the
binary nature of v(e) in his model.
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effort is first best, a further increase in u¯ is best compensated by lump sum
transfers (region III).
3 Bargaining game with alternating offers
We now consider the case where the principal and the agent bargain over
incentive compatible contracts that satisfy the agent’s financial constraint
F, F + b ≥ 0. We model the bargaining process as an alternating offer
game. In round 1, the principal offers a contract. If the agent accepts, the
contract is implemented. If he declines, the game proceeds to a second round
where the agent proposes a contract. If the principal accepts, the contract
is implemented. If she rejects, the game continues in the same manner with
alternating offers. We assume that the principal and the agent are impatient
and denote with δp, δa ∈ [0, 1] their respective discount factors.
For the moment, assume that there exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium. Perfection requires that the parties offer only contracts c ∈ C.
Accordingly, we can describe contract offers by points on the constrained
Pareto frontier P. Furthermore, from the previous section we know that P
is a concave function pi(u) whose domain is the interval [u∗∗, umax] and range
the interval [0, pimax]. Note that, unlike the standard bargaining game, the
agent’s impasse point, 0, does not belong to the domain of pi(u).
To determine the equilibrium, suppose the game were to attain period
3 in which the principal offers up ∈ [u∗∗, umax] to the agent. Going one
period back, the agent will match the principal’s present value of her period
3 utility, i.e. offer pia = δppi(up). Again going back one period, the principal
will offer up = max{u∗∗, δau(pia)} as we know from proposition 1 that it
can never be optimal to offer less than u∗∗ (see Figure 1). Accordingly, in
contrast to the standard alternating offer game there are situations where
the principal offers the agent more than his reservation utility δau(pia). By
stationarity of the game, we find upon substitution
up = max{u∗∗, δau(δppi(up))}. (7)
To prove existence of a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and to
characterize the fixed point, we map this expression in Figure 2. In pe-
riod 3 the agent’s utility will always be between u∗∗ and umax. Since
umax ≥ δau(δppi(umax)), the point D lies below the diagonal. Furthermore,
the slope of the function δau(δppi(up)) is
0 ≤ ∂δau(δppi(up))
∂up
= δau′(·)δppi′(up) ≤ 1. (8)
To verify the inequality, observe that from up ≤ u(δppi(up)) and the
concavity of pi(u), we obtain u′pi′ ≤ 1. Moreover, u′ and pi′ are both negative
and δp, δa ≤ 1. Hence there are two cases. If δau(δppi(u∗∗)) lies above
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the diagonal (like point A), then we have an interior fixed point like up.
Otherwise, δau(δppi(u)) is like BD and the fixed point is u∗∗. Variations in
the discount factors shift the curves. However, this affects only interior fixed
points. Unlike the standard alternating offer game, small variations in the
discount factors have no effect if the equilibrium offer is u∗∗.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that any point along the constrained
Pareto frontier can be represented by different profiles of the discount fac-
tors. For example, suppose δp = 0. With δa = 0 the agent receives u∗∗,
while with δa = 1, he receives u(0) = umax. Thus by continuity as δa rises
from 0 to 1, the agent’s utility must take all the values between u∗∗ and
umax.
We obtain the following result, where the second claim follows from the
fact that δau(δppi(up)) in (7) increases in δa and decreases in δp.
Proposition 2 The alternating offer game has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in contracts. Moreover, let (δ∗∗p , δ∗∗a ) be a profile of discount
factors such that equilibrium contract offers lead to (pi(u∗∗), u∗∗). Then for
all {(δp, δa) : δp ≥ δ∗∗p , δa ≤ δ∗∗a } equilibrium utility remains at (pi(u∗∗), u∗∗).
4 The Nash bargaining solution
Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) have shown that the standard
bargaining process with alternating offers can be approximated by the Nash
bargaining solution. We extend their result to the current moral hazard set
up. To do so, we initially hold bargaining power α constant and maximize
the Nash bargaining product
[F + bp(e)− c(e)]α[v(e)− F − bp(e)]1−α, (9)
δau(δppi(u))
u
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Figure 2: Fix points in alternating offer game
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with respect to contracts that are ex-post incentive compatible and satisfy
the agent’s financial constraint.5 With α = 0, the Nash bargaining product
equals the principal’s utility, and with α = 1 the agent’s utility. Obviously,
for these extreme cases the solution corresponds to the boundary points of
the constrained Pareto frontier (see Figure 1). For α ∈ (0, 1), the corre-
sponding Lagrangian becomes
L(e, F, ξ) = α ln [F +B(e)− c(e)] + (1− α) ln [v(e)− F −B(e)] + ξF,
with first-order conditions
α (B′(e)− c′(e))
F +B(e)− c(e) +
(1− α)(v′(e)−B′(e))
v(e)− F −B(e) = 0 (10)
α
F +B(e)− c(e) −
(1− α)
v(e)− F −B(e) + ξ = 0. (11)
When ξ = 0, the first best solution obtains since from substituting (11)
into (10)
α(B′(e)− c′(e))
F +B(e)− c(e) +
α(v′(e)−B′(e))
F +B(e)− c(e) = 0, (12)
which implies v′(e) = c′(e). Furthermore, (11) can be solved for
α =
F
v(e∗)− c(e∗) +
B(e∗)− c(e∗)
v(e∗)− c(e∗) , (13)
where the second term on the r.h.s defines a critical level of bargaining power
αc. For α ≥ αc the first best effort obtains and any increase in bargaining
power results in a larger F . Moreover, from (13) as α approaches 1 so that
the agent has the entire bargaining power, he extracts all the profit and
attains utility umax.
When ξ > 0, complementary slackness implies F = 0. Implicitly dif-
ferentiating (10) then yields de/dα > 0. Note that this inequality is strict
so that variations in α always affect the equilibrium contract. Finally, as α
approaches 0 the standard second best obtains.
In conclusion, as the agent’s bargaining power α goes from 0 to αc, effort
increases from the second best to the first best level and F remains at 0. As
α increases further, effort stays at the first best level and F adjusts. Finally,
observe that even though it is desirable from a welfare point of view to attain
first best effort, the principal will not willingly relinquish bargaining power
as it lowers her utility.
Proposition 3 The constrained Pareto frontier P (or, equivalently, the set
of contracts C) can be defined alternatively as the solution of (i) the P-A
5Note that participation is guaranteed by construction of the Nash-bargaining solution,
except for the extreme cases of α = 0 and α = 1, where the respective participation
constraints have to be added to the problem.
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model for different reservation utilities u¯, (ii) the alternating offer game
for different discount factors δp, δa, and (iii) the Nash bargaining game for
different bargaining power coefficients α. However, while changing α always
changes the equilibrium contract, this is not the case for changes in u¯ and
in δp, δa.
5 Conclusion
In this note we have analyzed three approaches to account for bargaining
power in a moral hazard framework, each of them leading to the same set
of contracts. Nevertheless, their usefulness will vary depending on the par-
ticular problem under consideration. For example, solving the alternating
offer game may be quite cumbersome. Similarly, measuring changes in bar-
gaining power by u¯ is unsatisfactory if one wants to understand the impact
of bargaining power on equilibrium utility.
Moreover, for sufficiently low levels of the agent’s bargaining power, in-
creasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash bargaining
game, but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game. This
is in clear contrast to standard bargaining problems without moral hazard.
Formally, it arises from the fact that the agent’s threat point in the Nash
bargaining game and his impasse point in the alternating offer game do not
belong to the domain of the function pi(u) that describes the constrained
Pareto frontier P (see, e.g., Muthoo 1999, 60).
There is a wide range of potential applications. For example, our moral
hazard model could represent a firm-worker relationship, where the worker’s
effort is non-contractible. In this case the appropriate approach to account
for bargaining power seems to depend on the particular framing of the prob-
lem. If we investigate the implications of a decreasing power of labor unions,
then the most natural modelling approach would probably be the Nash bar-
gaining solution or the alternative-offer game. By contrast, changes in the
social security system would most naturally be modelled as changes in the
worker’s reservation utility. Nevertheless, both will have similar effects in
our model, which suggests that reducing the worker’s bargaining power too
much may reduce overall efficiency.
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